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On the late afternoon of June 28, 1865, Captain Thomas G. Young, master of the 
whaleship Favorite, stood defiantly atop the roof of his cabin with bomb guns and firearms in his 
hands. His courage, perhaps inspired by liquor, was stout. Young was determined that his ship 
would not fall into Confederate possession, as so many whaling vessels had before. As a 
boarding party from the Confederate cruiser CSS Shenandoah approached, Young attempted to 
make his stand. However, his crew members removed the percussion caps from his guns just 
moments earlier, and as a result, his guns failed to fire. After one of the most intense encounters 
ever experienced by the Shenandoah’s crew, Young finally relented and surrendered.1 With the 
odds stacked against him, why did Young react like this? Why did he make this stand, laying his 
life on the line, to confront the Shenandoah, even when he knew he was destined to failure? 
 Young’s story was one of desperation. He feared, and rightly so, that the Confederate 
cruiser Shenandoah would destroy his whaling vessel and in the process would turn him into a 
pauper. With his vessel destroyed, he would lose thousands of dollars worth of investments, and 
he would be rendered penniless, returning home with nothing. To the nearly sixty-year-old 
Young, death at the hands of his enemy seemed preferable to this fate.  
 To many whaling merchants and masters from New Bedford, Captain Young’s 
desperation was not a novelty. The whaling industry made the Rotches, Robesons, Rodmans, 
Howlands, Hathaways, Swifts, Frenches, and countless other families among the wealthiest in 
the nation. However, during the American Civil War, Confederate commerce raiders prowled the 
world’s oceans. These cruisers attacked the maritime industries of the North, in the hopes that 
they could incapacitate the Northern economy. Although these vessels never affected the United 
States economy to the point of altering the outcome of the war, they proved effective at crippling 
the whaling industry. Wars had negatively impacted the whaling industry before, though. During 
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the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the U. S. whaling fleet was greatly diminished, 
and at points nearly destroyed. However, the industry always managed to rebound, coming back 
stronger than ever before. This time though, the industry never quite recovered, and part of this 
stemmed from the effect of the Confederate commerce raiders.  
 Many historians argue that the American Civil War was one of the leading causes of the 
decline of the American whaling industry, and perhaps the most destructive forces were 
Confederate commerce raiders. These did more to inflict damage upon this industry than any 
other occurrence during the war. A case study focusing on the city of New Bedford is the clearest 
and most sensible way to illustrate this. Since New Bedford was the hub of whaling industry and 
the home of well over half of the whaling fleet, this city best represents the effectiveness of the 
commerce raiders on the industry as a whole. The CSS Sumter, CSS Alabama, and the CSS 
Shenandoah single-handedly did the most to lead the whaling industry into its dying days.  
Nestled on the shores of the Acushnet River on the Massachusetts south coast, New 
Bedford is one of the most advantageous ports in the whole state. Initially settled in the mid-
1600s as part of the town of Old Dartmouth, the area became the settling grounds for the fringe 
elements of Plymouth society. Religious outcastes, such as the Quakers and the Baptists settled 
these regions on the Plymouth Colony’s frontier.2 More than a century later, in May 1765, 
Joseph Rotch, a prominent Nantucket whaling merchant and Quaker, purchased a large tract of 
land in New Bedford. This was a major turning point in the city’s history. As historian Christina 
Arato explains, “To Joseph Rotch is credited the capital and expertise that led to the rapid 
development and remarkable success of the whaling industry and, consequently, the burgeoning 
of the village.”3 Through the remaining decades of the eighteenth and the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the whaling industry multiplied and expanded. By 1850, New Bedford was 
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the largest whaling port in the world. With well over three hundred vessels and millions of 
dollars of annual revenue, New Bedford was the richest city in the U.S. in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Even at this point, the Quakers were still among the most powerful and influential 
figures in the city.4 These Quaker merchants and their ardent beliefs still shaped the political and 
social landscape of New Bedford. 
 From very early on, the Quakers or, as they preferred to be called, Friends were among 
the most forward thinking people in the new nation. Many of the early abolitionists, for example, 
were Quakers. Their faith gave them a strong belief in the equality of people before God. 
Because of this, many Quakers were appalled by the South’s “peculiar institution” and some 
worked to abolish slavery in the North. “Quaker manumission” was the name of the process by 
which slavery was slowly terminated in most Northern states.5 Thus, it was no surprise that New 
Bedford, with its strong Quaker influence, developed into a hub for fugitive slaves on the 
Underground Railroad. Although statistics are difficult to determine because of the clandestine 
nature of the Underground Railroad, historians like Lee Blake, the President of the New Bedford 
Historical Society, estimate that between 1840-1860, there were approximately 300-700 fugitive 
slaves being harbored in the city at any given time.6 The New Bedford Vigilance Committee, 
intended to protect and aide runaway slaves while in the city, was one of the most active and 
effective anywhere in the North. Mobs chased out slave catchers who came to New Bedford in 
search of fugitives. As a result, animosity grew between Southerners and Northern cities like 
New Bedford.7 It was no mistake when war broke out, that the Confederate government wanted 
to harass the maritime industries of the North. Not only could they cripple the Northern economy 
by attacking the merchant marine, but they could also get revenge for all those years that port 
cities like New Bedford hid their stolen human property and fomented the seeds of abolitionism.  
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 In April of 1861, Confederate guns opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, 
South Carolina, and within a week of this incident, both presidents signed laws that dramatically 
affected New Bedford’s whaling industry. On April 17, Confederate President Jefferson Davis 
legalized the practice of issuing letters of marque to private citizens.8 In effect, this was a 
governmentally sponsored form of piracy. Individual citizens, owning ships or in easy access to 
them, applied for letters of marque, and attacked the northern merchant marine under the 
sanction of the Confederate government. If successful, privateers received prize money and sold 
the captured vessel’s cargo for profit. Within a few months, there were over two dozen of these 
privateers operating in the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.9 Two days later, on April 19, 
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln issued orders commencing a blockade of all southern coastal 
ports from South Carolina to Texas. A little over a week later, on April 27, the blockade was 
extended to include coastal ports in Virginia and North Carolina.10 In order for this blockade to 
be effective it would have to cover about 3,500 miles of coastline. For even the largest 
contemporary navy, this would be impossible, and it was especially difficult for the small, U.S. 
Navy dispatched to stations across the globe. This was a “herculean task,” and something had to 
be done fast in order to effectively establish a blockade.11   
 One possible solution was proposed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Fox. 
Fox proposed the buying of old merchant vessels that could be sunk in southern harbors, 
blocking the major shipping channels. In effect, they could blockade important ports without 
having to place vessels on active patrol in those locations. George Morgan, the government’s 
purchasing agent, authorized I. H. Bartlett and Sons to offer New Bedford merchants ten dollars 
per ton for ships. With the average whaling vessel being somewhere between two-hundred-and-
fifty and five-hundred tons, an old, dilapidated whaler could offer a $2,500 to $5,000 pay day. 
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Not bad for a vessel that was far past its prime and was no longer viable for a whaling cruise.12 
By November of 1861, sixteen old whalers sailed for Charleston Harbor, where most were sunk 
in the Main Shipping Channel. Later in January 1862, roughly ten more New Bedford whalers 
sailed for Charleston Harbor and were sunk there.13 In all, approximately twenty-six old New 
Bedford whaling vessels were utilized in this fashion and famously became known as the “Stone 
Fleet.” But this was only the beginning of what would be four more years of difficult war for 
New Bedford’s industry. 
 As the Stone Fleet sailed for the South, Confederate privateers were lurking in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. When President Davis issued the proclamation allotting for 
letters of marque and reprisal, the maritime ports of the North responded with outrage. On April 
23, the Whalemen’s Shipping List reprinted an article which had appeared the previous week in 
the New York Times. Undoubtedly, the sentiment of the New York journalist who wrote the 
article was shared by nearly all in New Bedford, when he wrote, “The letters of marque and 
reprisal is a war upon private property, and stands in marked disgraceful contrast with that of the 
President’s proclamation in which he declares that ‘the rights of private property shall be 
respected.’ The next step of the Confederates in rebellion will be to confiscate all debts from 
Southern men to Northern creditors.”14 To the New York journalist, the latter half of that 
statement might have been more concerning considering many of those debts he was talking 
about were held by New York creditors, but to the New Bedford merchants, the first half of this 
statement was incredibly disturbing. Should the Confederate’s idea come to fruition, these pirates 
would harass and destroy not just any property, but their property. To them, the war was 
certainly a justified cause, but their investments, their property, their wealth were now on the 
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line, and the war was not even a month old. If this was any indication of what was yet to come in 
this war, many New Bedford merchants were uneasy about their future economic wellbeing.  
 Even at this moment, when others may have backed down, many New Bedford 
merchants became even stronger in their support for the war. One article entitled, “A Quaker’s 
Opinion of the War,” which appeared in the same April 23, 1861 edition of the Whalemen’s 
Shipping List plainly demonstrated the Quaker merchant’s thoughts on the war. The article told 
of a Quaker merchant who approached one of his clerks and asked if the young man was going to 
enlist to fight for the Union. When the clerk hesitated because he was afraid that he might lose 
his job should he enlist, the Quaker merchant retorted, “If thee will enlist, not only shall thee 
have thee situation, but thee salary shall go on while thee is absent. But if thou will not serve 
thee country, thee cannot stay in this store.”15 Whether or not this story was factual or not can be 
debated among historians. However, regardless of the veracity of this article, it proved a clear 
point. No matter what economic dangers these merchants faced, they would remain ardently 
loyal to the Union cause, and although their religion did not allow them to fight, they would 
encourage all those whom they had influence over to enlist. If President Davis’s goal was to 
perhaps force the hand of Northern merchants by threatening their shipping with letters of 
marque, it did not work. These Northern merchants would not seek a peaceful termination to the 
war, if anything their resolve grew stronger. The best Davis could hope for was that these newly 
christened privateers would be successful in harassing and maybe even crippling the Northern 
merchant marine. 
 Approximately twenty-five private vessels took up President Davis’s offer in 1861 and 
began work as privateers. Due to a multitude of factors, these vessels proved much less 
productive than originally expected. Over the next year, Confederate privateers captured or 
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destroyed approximately thirty U.S. vessels.16 Although this number may seem relatively 
productive, it was a far cry from what the Confederate government had originally hoped for. 
Because most of the privateers operated along the Southern or Northern coast, they were well 
within the range of the lurking Union naval blockade. As a result, the privateers did not have free 
reign over the seas, but rather had to remain in hiding for large portions of time, awaiting a dark 
night, or a temporary lull in their opposition’s naval activity. Many privateers worked in 
conjuncture with blockade runners, but these endeavors also proved dangerous and difficult. The 
net result was little productivity, and although the Confederate government continued the 
practice of issuing letters of marque, it was clear to the Confederate Secretary of the Navy, 
Stephen Mallory, that if his government wished to wreak havoc on the Northern maritime 
economy, privateering was not the answer and an alternative would have to be identified.17   
 Even though they achieved little success, privateers did capture three whalers. All three 
were from Provincetown, Massachusetts.18 Even though New Bedford was not directly affected 
by these events, the fear and aguish which the privateers manifested in the populace was beyond 
comparison. Nearly every edition of the Whalemen’s Shipping List starting in April 1861, and 
continuing for the rest of that year, had at least one article about the fiendish privateers lurking in 
the Atlantic Ocean. One particular article in the April 30 edition proclaimed that all Northern 
ports should be wary of a pirate invasion.19 To think New Bedford would have been invaded by 
one of these privateers seems foolhardy to the contemporary reader, but to the people of the time, 
it was a very real threat. This demonstrated the hysteria which existed, not only in New Bedford, 
but in all Northern port cities. It is true that these activities did not break the Quaker merchants’ 
will to fight, but these activities instilled fear in these men. Although privateers did not capture a 
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single New Bedford whaler, their activities indirectly affected the industry’s economy by 
arousing anxiety among Northern merchants.   
 These economic facets made whaling less profitable and diverted important funds away 
from investment. Interest rates began to rise as a result of the privateering activities. Insurance 
premiums nearly doubled within a few months but coverage remained the same. The major 
insurance companies like the Union Mutual Marine Insurance Company and the Pacific Mutual 
Insurance Company offered their $200,000 of capital on risks not exceeding $20,000.20 Just as 
insurance prices rose, whalers protested for higher lays based upon the new danger they now 
faced at sea.1 The whalers pleading succeeded and higher lays were given to everyone from the 
green-hands to the mates.21 These combined factors cut into the merchant’s profit margins and 
caused the first economic hardships inflicted during the war. The Confederate privateers had not 
scored a single New Bedford vessel, but they had negatively affected the industry. Just by being 
on the waters, privateers delivered the first prominent economic blow to New Bedford’s whaling 
economy. 
 As the privateers floundered, Secretary Mallory realized that if Confederate forces were 
going to cause any major disruptions to the Northern merchant marine, they were going to have 
to take their work to the high seas. In early 1861, as the Confederate government bought up 
every spare vessel it could, Confederate operatives purchased the merchant steamship, Habana 
in New Orleans. The 473 ton vessel was commissioned as the CSS Sumter on June 3, 1861 and 
was placed under the command of Lieutenant Raphael Semmes. Mallory tasked the fifty-one 
year old Semmes with breaching the blockade, sailing to the open ocean, and doing “the enemy’s 
                                                           
1 The lay system was the standard utilized by almost all whaling ships. Each whaler would be paid according to his 
share of the total profit brought in by the vessel at the end of the cruise. This share was known as a lay. Effectively 
by pushing for a higher lay, the whalemen were raising the share of the catch which was considered theirs at the end 
of the voyage. 
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commerce the greatest injury, in the shortest time.”22 This mission was slightly different than that 
of the privateers who were private citizens and mostly operated close to the coast. All 
commissioned sailors and officers constituted the crew of the Sumter, and they would operate in 
the vast expanses of the Atlantic. This cruiser was not considered a privateer, but was the first of 
what would be termed Confederate commerce raiders. Hopefully the Sumter, by traveling far 
away from the North American coast and harassing U.S. interests in international waters, could 
draw Union naval vessels away from the blockade to protect Northern mariners.23  
 In late June 1861, Semmes and his crew broke through the Union blockade near the 
mouth of the Mississippi River and headed towards the Atlantic. By the end of July, the cruiser 
captured ten vessels off the coast of Cuba and then turned southward, heading towards the 
Brazilian coast. In the following months, the Sumter captured five more vessels, and as 
November turned to December, Semmes and his men patrolled the North Atlantic. Semmes’s 
main target was the merchant vessels which journeyed through these waters from North America 
to Europe. Hopefully, by patrolling the frequented routes, they could capture heavily laden 
mariners and interrupt international trade.24 Although they never intended to attack a whaler, on 
the morning of December 8, New Bedford received its first taste of the effect Confederate 
commerce raiders would have on the industry in the coming years. 
 That morning was a stormy one. With a thick fog and rough seas, the crew of the Sumter 
barely spotted the sails in the distance. Approaching the vessel, Semmes showed the United 
States flag and the listing vessel did likewise. Seeing that the vessel was a whaling bark, the 
Sumter raised the Confederate flag leaving the whaler with few options of escape. As a result, the 
vessel surrendered almost immediately. The boarding party determined the bark was the 
Ebenezer Dodge of New Bedford. Just twelve days out and bound for the Pacific Ocean, the 
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Ebenezer Dodge hit rough weather and had sprung a leak. The damaged ship was of no value to 
the Sumter so after removing the provisions and supplies, Semmes ordered his crew to burn the 
bark around 6 PM.2 Taking the Ebenezer Dodge’s twenty-two man crew as prisoner, Semmes 
continued his voyage towards the Strait of Gibraltar where the cruiser added two more captures 
to its log. In late January of 1862, Lieutenant Semmes was forced to abandon the vessel at 
Gibraltar because it could not be repaired, and the Sumter’s voyage was over.25  
 The Sumter only captured one New Bedford vessel, but this was a premonition of what 
was to come. Because the Ebenezer Dodge had just begun its voyage and was yet to capture a 
single whale, there was no product lost. But as the whaling bark burned, B. Franklin Howland, 
the vessel’s owner, lost nearly $30,000-$40,000 of value in his ship.26 With this event, New 
Bedford’s worst fears were also realized. Now the threat of destruction at the hands of 
Confederates was not just a premonition, but was a reality, and as the Confederate government 
prepared more cruisers for duty as commerce raiders, the prospects for whalers were starting to 
look bleak. As for Lieutenant Raphael Semmes; he was not done with New Bedford’s whaling 
industry. In fact, his harassing of the industry had only begun.  
 Although Semmes was forced to sell the Sumter off of Gibraltar, Confederate operative 
James Bulloch worked arduously to purchase vessels from shipwrights and merchants in Great 
Britain. Clandestinely, Bulloch worked the British market, keeping his purpose concealed as to 
not violate Britain’s neutrality in the war. This was of critical importance to the Confederate 
government. According to international law, Britain’s neutrality meant the British government 
could not knowingly supply war material to either side of the war. Eager to maintain this 
neutrality, Great Britain refused to openly help the Confederate war effort. The Confederates 
                                                           
2 Because whaling voyage lasted for years at a time, and these vessels traveled for thousands of miles before arriving 
at the fishing grounds, whalers were always heavily laden with extra supplies. For a Confederate commerce raider, 
capturing a vessel like this was the perfect time to do some much needed supply requisitioning. 
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appeased the British because they were one of the only possible allies they had. As a result, 
Bulloch purchased these vessels under an alias, and supplied the ships with materials from 
several different chandleries to ensure secrecy.27 He secured several purchases in the early years 
of the war, including the CSS Alabama which launched from Birkenhead Ironworks in Liverpool 
on July 29, 1862. Since Semmes was without a vessel, Bulloch summoned him to Liverpool to 
take command of the newly christened steamer. With a vessel and commander, Bulloch sent 
Semmes off to harass Union shipping wherever it could be found.28   
 Semmes decided on his first target shortly after the Alabama’s departure. In his memoirs 
he recalled, “I resolved to strike a blow at the enemy’s whale-fishery, off the Azores.”29 In late 
summer, the Gulf Stream carries thousands of tons of krill and plankton northward from the 
Tropics and dumps them off the coast of the Azores in the Northern Atlantic. For centuries, right 
whales migrated to this location to feast on ample supplies of food in preparation for the winter 
months. This feeding frenzy lasts from late August until about October 1, and as a result, whalers 
journeyed to these waters to take advantage of the gathering of so many right whales.30   This 
species of whale is very docile and relatively easy to hunt and kill. Thus, whalers from New 
Bedford and other Northern ports would frequently make the Azores their first stop on their way 
to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, or their last stop on the way home. With no protection being 
offered to these whalers by the U.S. navy, they stood little chance against the well-armed and 
speedy Alabama. Semmes realized the precarious predicament whalemen found themselves in. 
He later stated, “Unlike the ships of commerce, the whalers are obliged to congregate within 
small well-known spaces of ocean and remain there for weeks at a time, whilst the whaling 
season lasts. It was the most obvious thing in the world, that these vessels, thus clustered 
together, should attract the attention of the Confederate cruisers.”31 Arriving off the Azorean 
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coast in early September, his timing could not have been better. He was on the whaling grounds 
at the peak of the season, and his aptitude paid off. By October 3, the Alabama captured eleven 
whalers.32  
 This fact was felt keenly by whaling merchants. These men knew the nature of their 
industry and foresaw exactly what Semmes described. This was undoubtedly the reason why 
whalers, more than any other maritime industry, decried the privateers and commerce raiders. 
Merchants sailed the oceans either individually or in small groups, making them almost 
impossible to find on the wide oceans of the world. However, whalers, like all fishermen, were 
found in the same spots, at the same times every year. When the Whalemen’s Shipping List 
denounced privateers and Confederate cruisers on a weekly basis throughout the course of the 
war, they did it because they knew that they were easy prey for these vessels. Ultimately it was 
whalers that stood to lose the most to these activities.  
 Foresight could not stop the Alabama though. On September 5, 1862, the cruiser secured 
her first capture. The vessel proved to be the Ocmulgee, a whaler out of Edgartown, MA. She 
was captured a mere eleven days after the Alabama had been commissioned, and was the first of 
many vessels that the prolific Confederate cruiser added to her logs over the next nearly two 
years. After capturing another whaler two days later on the seventh, the Alabama came across 
her first New Bedford whaler on September 8.  
 Late that afternoon, the lookouts on the Alabama spotted a large ship to the northwest. 
Sunset was nearing so the Confederate crew had to act fast. Showing the American colors as they 
approached, the ship was quickly recognized to be an American whaler. After securing the 
vessel’s surrender, the ship’s master turned over his papers to Captain Semmes. These identified 
the vessel as New Bedford’s Ocean Rover which was returning from a nearly three and a half 
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year voyage with a full hold. After spending several years in the Indian Ocean, the captain of the 
whaler decided to make one final stop at the Azores to top off what was a highly successful 
voyage. This proved to be an awful mistake as all the Ocean Rover’s hard work was burned later 
that night.33 Approximately eleven hundred barrels of whale oil were incinerated, costing the 
owner of the Ocean Rover $70,000.34 However, the whaling captain apparently heard of how 
Semmes allowed the crew of the Ocmulgee to row to shore in their whaleboats, and he requested 
his crew be allotted the same privilege. The Alabama was about five miles from shore though, 
and Semmes wondered whether or not the whaler could make the journey. The master replied 
that it was a short distance for whalers so Semmes acquiesced to his request. The crew of the 
Ocean Rover returned to their vessel and worked feverishly to load as much as possible into the 
six boats. When they returned to the Alabama with whaleboats so full they were almost sinking, 
Semmes expressed concern for the wellbeing of the boats and crew. The New Bedford captain, 
as optimistic as ever called back, “Oh! No! They are as buoyant as ducks, and we shall not ship a 
drop of water.” Content with the response, Captain Semmes allowed the crew to depart. As they 
paddled towards shore, into the sunset, Semmes gawked at the beauty of the scene, remarking 
that they looked like Venetian gondolas paddling through the narrow cannels of Venice.35   
 As the Ocean Rover burned the next day alongside the Starlight and the Alert, the 
Alabama’s first capture had been a decisive one. Seventy thousand dollars was no small sum and 
this dramatically affected the vessel’s owner and the psyche of New Bedford. By the time news 
arrived back in New Bedford several months later, local papers angrily criticized the Confederate 
pirate. In an attempt to deface the Alabama’s honor, New Bedford papers like the Republican 
Standard claimed Semmes burned the captured whaleships at night in order to play upon the 
sailor’s natural impulse to help his fellow mariners in anguish. They argued that when they saw 
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the flames, sailors would immediately go to help the vessel in distress, and the Alabama would 
be slyly waiting for them.36 This simply was not the case though, as Semmes knew that burning 
the vessel at night would probably have the opposite effect by alerting the whalers that the 
Confederate commerce raider was near at hand.37 Articles like this one were a great example of 
the propaganda the New Bedford press sought to perpetuate. The more they vilified the 
commerce raiders, the more likely the U.S. navy was to intervene and come to the rescue of 
whalers. But more importantly, articles such as this one demonstrate how fear gripped these 
people and in that aspect, the Confederates were achieving their goal. However, no matter how 
much New Bedford’s and other Northern city’s periodicals criticized the Alabama, these 
criticisms were not going to stop the further destruction of the industry.  
 Nearly a week later, beginning on September 13 and continuing for the next five days, 
the Alabama captured and destroyed four more New Bedford whalers. The first vessel was the 
Altamaha which surrendered without a fight. Although this vessel had been at sea for five 
months, the master had little success in capturing the great leviathan. As a result, only about 
$3,000 of product was destroyed when the Altamaha was ignited.38 As inconsequential as this 
capture was, the Alabama caught sight of another vessel later that night which led to a much 
more eventful chase and propitious outcome. 
 With the moon shining brightly, the Alabama spotted another whaler in the distance and 
made chase. They gained quickly on the vessel and within a few hours they were within a mile of 
the vessel. Semmes ordered the customary warning shot fired and prepared for boarding the 
whaler. However, it was evident that this ship was not willing to give up yet. Captain Semmes 
was not in the mood to play games at such a late hour and thus fired a second warning shot. This 
second round quickly brought the ship’s master to his senses and he immediately stopped his 
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course and ran down his colors. It was now nearly daylight so Semmes sent a boarding crew to 
the vessel and returned to his quarters for a nap. When he arose the next morning, he found the 
Benjamin Tucker of New Bedford was his new prize. This whaler left New Bedford eight months 
prior and was off to a decent start on this voyage with about three hundred and fifty barrels of oil 
onboard.39 The crew of the Alabama gutted the Tucker of all valuable supplies and materials, 
brought the thirty person crew on board the vessel, and set the whaler on fire by 10 AM. As the 
ship burned, nearly $18,000 worth of profit burned with it.40  
 Three days later, the Alabama gave chase to another potential capture. This vessel was 
the Virginia, a whaleship a mere twenty days out from New Bedford. The master of the vessel, 
Captain Tilton, believed he could outrun his pursuers because the Virginia was one of the fastest 
whalers in the fleet. However, they stood little chance against the steam and wind powered 
cruiser, and within three and a half hours the whaler belonged to the Alabama. Having just left 
port, there was little oil or other whale products onboard, but what it lacked in oil, the vessel 
made up in supplies. The Confederate crew requisitioned these valuable goods and set the whaler 
on fire.41 This cost Captain Tilton and William Hathaway Jr, the owner of the Virginia, about 
$25,000.42   
 With the crew of the Virginia onboard, the Alabama continued its search and destroy 
mission. Foul weather blew in that night and the next day, in the midst of a violent storm, the 
commerce raider caught another New Bedford whaler. This vessel was the Elisha Dunbar which 
Semmes burned immediately, even before viewing the bark’s papers. Captain Semmes took this 
uncharacteristic move because the weather was becoming worse as the day drew on and wanted 
to do away with his newest capture before the storm intensified further. Similar to the Virginia, 
this bark was only twenty-four days out from New Bedford so not much in the way of product 
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was destroyed. However, the extensive supplies on the vessel were all burned along with the 
Elisha Dunbar herself, costing merchants W. and G. D. Watkins $25,000.43  
 In only five days, the Alabama captured four New Bedford whalers costing four separate 
merchants approximately $71,000.44 In 1862 the whaling industry brought in $61,056 in whale 
oil with the total importation value of whale products at $5,051,782.45 Just the destruction of 
these four whalers caused $10,000 more in damages than the worth of all the oil brought into the 
port during the entire year. These mere five days also cost New Bedford merchants almost two 
percent of their entire profit for that year. On the surface, this may not seem like much, but when 
one considers that the average whaler returning to port usually brought in $50,000 to $70,000, 
the loss of these four vessels cost somewhere around $250,000 in potential profit in addition to 
the $71,000 in just supplies and already caught product. In addition to this sum, each one of 
those vessels was worth an average of $40,000 meaning that the total valuation of the ships 
destroyed was around $160,000. When these losses are added up, these four days cost New 
Bedford merchants a net loss of nearly $500,000 in actual damages and potential profit. This 
astronomical sum was a blow that this weakened industry could not afford.  
 With his vessel destroyed and reputation tarnished, Captain Tilton, master of the 
Virginia, lost no time in criticizing the vile Raphael Semmes when he returned to port. In one 
article carried by all the local newspapers, Tilton bemoaned the conditions the Confederates 
forced him and his crew to live in. He explained that as prisoners they lived on deck, in the midst 
of a horrible storm, being at all times soaked and sometimes awaking, “nearly under water.” The 
food was inedible and the crew had to wash in salt water. Tilton argued the vengeful Semmes 
and his crew sought to punish the whalers and they were no better than thieves and pirates.46 
Captain Semmes rebutted this claim after the war, feeling his honor was infringed upon. He 
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knew his position was a murky one in that he attacked private merchants instead of fighting an 
enemy vessel in the open. At a time when war was still a “gentleman’s affair,” this means of 
warfare seemed detestable to most polite society. However, what Semmes and his crew were 
doing was nothing new in the annals of war, and when these very Yankee whalemen sought to 
infringe upon the economics of the South, they did not think anything of it. He believed he was a 
commerce raider, but certainly this did not make him a pirate. Thus, in his own defense, he fired 
back at Tilton after the war. Although he did acquiesce that the prisoners were kept on deck and 
probably got wet several times, they were surely not wet the entire time, and there was simply 
nowhere else for them to stay. If he had put them on the berth-deck, his own crew would have 
been without a place to sleep. And, as for the food and salt water baths, Semmes snidely 
remarked, “It was certainly a hardship that Captain Tilton should have nothing better to eat than 
my own crew, and should be obliged, like them, to wash in salt water.”47   
 This quibbling may seem immaterial to the modern reader, but back in this time period, 
this was no laughing matter. Captain Tilton fought back with the only thing he had, his words. 
Like Tilton, all New Bedford merchants and masters had no other way to protect their vessels 
against this very real threat. Their only hope was to stir up enough discontent to force local 
politicians to lobby the naval department to help. However, these words had little more effect 
than to infringe upon Semmes’s honor. In the end, the federal government took little action to 
protect the whaling industry, and the whalers’ only hope was to continue to support the war 
effort in the hope that it would quickly terminate. This was one example of a desperate act from 
a desperate people. 
 But the Alabama’s rampage had just begun. Through the month of October, the 
commerce raider caught and burned eight more American merchant vessels, but none of these 
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were whaling ships. As they continued to sail in the Atlantic, they suddenly stumbled upon a 
New Bedford whaler on November 2. This vessel was only four days out from port and was 
amply stocked with fresh provision and supplies.48 This was the Levi Starbuck which had just 
begun a thirty month voyage to the Pacific Ocean’s whaling grounds. Even though the Starbuck 
was fresh out of port, Confederate sailors destroyed approximately $25,000 of valued goods 
when they set her ablaze.49 It was by pure luck that the Alabama had found this vessel. No longer 
on the whaling grounds, the two vessels merely crossed paths. Unfortunately for Edward 
Howland, the owner of the Starbuck, his vessel crossed paths with the wrong ship and yet 
another New Bedford whaling vessel met a watery grave. 
 Equally unlucky were the barks Lafayette and Nye. The following April of 1863, the 
Confederate cruiser prowled the waters off the coast of Brazil and stumbled upon the Lafayette. 
She was four or five miles off the Alabama’s bow and within a couple of hours the commerce 
raider was upon her. After the Alabama fired the customary warning shot, the first mate of the 
Lafayette had no recourse but to surrender. The Captain of the bark had died at sea several weeks 
earlier, and in a panic as the Alabama approached, the first mate of the whaler threw the bark’s 
papers overboard. This act did not save his ship though. Within an hour of her capture the 
whaling vessel was on fire.50 This was a $20,908 bonfire for the owners of the Lafayette.51  
 Subsequently, on April 24, the Alabama captured her ninth New Bedford whaler. This 
vessel was the Nye which was returning from a thirty-one month cruise in the Pacific Ocean, 
“during which her crew had become almost as much Sandwich Islanders, as Americans in 
appearance.” The crew had already shipped home two cargoes of oil, but still had about four 
hundred and twenty-five barrels onboard as they returned home. The one remaining capstone to 
finish off such a successful voyage would be to sail down the Acushnet River and into the harbor 
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to deliver these last barrels for their final payday. However, the Alabama would not allow such a 
triumphal return to port.52 The overly oily Nye easily went up in flames and the $31,000 worth of 
product was destroyed.53  
 All three of these vessels, the Levi Starbuck, the Lafayette, and the Nye were captured, in 
a way, accidentally. None were caught on whaling grounds, and all were unlucky enough to 
cross courses with the Alabama on their way to the whaling grounds or on their way home. A 
jubilant Semmes remarked, “The fates seemed to have a grudge against New England fishermen, 
and would persist in throwing them in my way, although I was not on whaling-grounds.”54 
Whether it was the fates or the vengeful whales which kept sending whalers the Alabama’s way, 
the effects of these unexpected encounters could not be overlooked. Yet even though these were 
the last of the New Bedford whalers that Semmes captured, the Alabama’s journeys were far 
from over. By May of 1864, this Confederate cruiser captured and destroyed fifty-five U.S. 
merchant vessels equaling about $4,613,914 in damages.55 Ultimately, in June of that same year, 
the Alabama met her own watery grave at the hands of the USS Kearsarge off the English coast. 
But the damage was already done.  
Semmes’s Alabama captured a total of sixteen whaling vessels with exactly half of these 
being from New Bedford. The Confederates destroyed approximately $218,000 worth of 
product, supplies, and vessels from New Bedford whalers, which equates to over $3,000,000 in 
modern value.56 To say that sum was devastating is an understatement. If one were to imagine a 
modern city losing over three million dollars in less than a year, images of places like Detroit and 
Flint, MI after the motor industry’s collapse would come to mind. The effect of the capture of 
just eight vessels on New Bedford was certainly traumatic in 1863. This also affected the war as 
well. As Semmes remarked to one disgruntled whaler, “Every whale you strike will put money 
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into the Federal treasury, and strengthen the hands of your people to carry on the war. I am afraid 
I must burn your ship.”57 Captain Semmes was right. By harming the industry, he altered the 
New Bedford merchants’ ability to fund the war. At this point, half way through the war, the 
Stone Fleet and activities of Confederate commerce raiders reduced the New Bedford whaling 
fleet by over twenty-five percent.58 This effectiveness would not be overlooked by Southern 
authorities. As the Alabama fought her final battle against the USS Kearsarge, Confederate 
Secretary of the Navy Mallory and other Confederate officials considered sending out a new 
cruiser with the sole purpose of destroying the enemy’s whaling fleet. They surmised this could 
maximize a commerce raider’s efficacy, and they were not wrong. 
 As Confederate officials discussed possible targets for a new cruiser, Bulloch went about 
procuring a vessel for this service. He settled on an iron-framed, full-rigged ship with auxiliary 
steam power known as the Sea King. Recently returned to England from Bombay, this vessel 
was the perfect material for a cruiser. As a result, Bulloch began the painstakingly tedious task of 
buying and outfitting the vessel. The Confederate naval department searched for a commander of 
this vessel and settled upon Lieutenant James I. Waddell. Waddell was a North Carolinian with 
over twenty years of experience in the U.S. navy. He was by far the most qualified candidate to 
lead this expedition, and his first order of business was preparing the vessel for service as a 
commerce raider. By mid-October, 1864, the Sea King was rechristened the CSS Shenandoah, 
and was off on its mission to destroy the whaling fleet of the North Pacific.59  
 Waddell’s order from Bulloch, dated October 5, 1864, explicitly stated the purpose of the 
mission. In the opening two sentences of this letter, Bulloch wrote, “Sir: You are about to 
proceed upon a cruise in the far-distant Pacific, into the seas and among the islands frequented 
by the great American whaling fleet, a source of abundant wealth to our enemies and a nursery 
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for their seamen. It is hoped that you may be able to greatly damage and disperse that fleet, even 
if you do not succeed in utterly destroying it.”60 Building upon the success of Semmes and his 
Alabama in attacking the whaling fleet off the coast of the Azores, Bulloch hoped Waddell could 
achieve even more success by attacking the much larger and much more productive Northern 
Pacific whaling fleet. If the Shenandoah could wreak havoc, they stood a good chance of either 
permanently disrupting or even destroying that season’s fleet. This would have little effect on the 
Presidential election the next month, but if Lincoln did win reelection, the Confederates were 
going to have to do something to prolong the war. As a result, if they could successfully strike a 
major blow at the industry, they could reduce the amount of money funding the war effort. This 
was also a wise endeavor, for as Semmes recognized, the whalers were going to be on the 
grounds no matter what, and would be undefended as the U.S. navy had no vessels in the Arctic 
or North Pacific region.61 The whalers were sitting ducks, and although they feared commerce 
raiders, they never expected they would be attacked in the far reaches of the northern most 
ocean. Thus, a voyage like this one was the most cost effective way to inflict the maximum 
potential of damage on the Northern maritime economy. For the war weary and economically 
struggling South, this proved the best way to possibly change the course of the war. With the 
fates aligned in their favor, the Shenandoah set forth on what would be one of the most 
destructive cruises in whaling history. 
 It was in the South Atlantic that Waddell and his crew caught their first whaler. It was 
about five in the afternoon of December 4, 1864, in what Captain Charles P. Worth, the master 
of the idle whaler, described as “thick weather.” With a fairly dense mist hanging over the water, 
Captain Waddell stealthily directed his steamer towards the unsuspecting vessel and its crew. 
This was the whaling bark Edward of New Bedford, which was in the process of “cutting in” a 
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right whale they had recently captured. Waddell dispatched a boarding party and by the time the 
busily working seamen realized what was happening, it was already too late. Captain Worth 
realized the most propitious course of action was to surrender.62 The crew of the Shenandoah 
spent the next two days stripping the Edward of all provisions. Waddell then burned the bark and 
transported his prisoners to Tristan da Cunha where he dropped them off on the island under the 
protection of the locals. Several weeks later, the USS Iroquois retrieved the crew and delivered 
them to Cape Town, South Africa where they spent several more weeks until finally making their 
return voyage home. All in all, Waddell’s first whaler was a decent catch.63  
 This first prize was worth about $20,000.64 When one considers that this estimate 
accounts for both the value of the vessel and its cargo, it appears that historian Tom Chaffin’s 
appraisal of this being, “a modest amount compared with that of other prizes,” is a logical 
conclusion.65 The right whale that the crew of the Edward was working on was only its first 
catch, so aside from the worth of the vessel and its provisions, the economic blow was 
comparatively little. However, a letter written by Captain Worth, dated January 10, 1865, 
indicated the psychological effect of this capture. In exasperation Worth wrote, “We were robbed 
of everything we possessed but our clothing and part of that was stolen on board the 
Shenandoah. We were boiling our first whale when captured, which would have made 100 bbls. 
of oil.3 My officers, crew, and myself, are dependent on the U.S. Consul at this place [Cape 
Town], not one of us left with a dollar.”66 This letter was finally published in the March 7, 1865 
edition of the Whalemen’s Shipping List and figured prominently at the top of the second page. 
Undoubtedly, hundreds of subscribers read this painful cry from one of their own and foresaw 
the destruction yet to come. With the Alabama gone, once depressed merchants found new hope 
                                                           
3 Bbls. was a unit of measure of barrels of oil. One bbl is the equivalent of approximately 42 gallons of oil per 
barrel. Thus, 100 bbls of oil equals 4,200 gallons of oil. 
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that the world’s oceans would once again be safe, but now a new Confederate threat lurked on 
the oceans and it was certainly one to be feared. Even though their fears were being realized once 
again, few New Bedford merchants could imagine the rampage the CSS Shenandoah was about 
to embark on.   
 After a brief layover in Melbourne, Australia to refit, the Shenandoah headed north 
towards the Caroline Islands. It was in the harbor of Ascension Island (modern Ponape Island, 
Micronesia) that Waddell located his key to success. Four vessels lay at anchor in the harbor, and 
all were American whalers. Only one, the ship Hector, was from New Bedford, but these four 
vessels were a valuable prize. These whaling vessels had been away for several years and had 
nearly full holds. Between the Hector and the Edward Carey of San Francisco, the crew of the 
Shenandoah found nearly five hundred barrels of whale oil. This was no minor sum, as these 
were worth well over $73,000 dollars.67 Once the Confederates cleared the ship of everything of 
value to them, Captain Waddell allowed the local islanders to loot the ships in exchange for the 
islanders taking the Yankee prisoners. Following a day in which the islanders took anything left 
on the vessels which had any value, the Hector was one of three vessels set ablaze.68  This cost 
the master of the Hector well over $58,000; not to mention the permanent loss of his ship and his 
large investments in supplies.69  
 However, Waddell procured something even more valuable from the masters of these 
four vessels. Amongst the captured materials were the extensive charts and maps of the North 
Pacific whaling grounds. Now, not only was Waddell armed with the precise charts necessary for 
navigating the often deadly Pacific and Arctic Oceans, but he knew the exact location of the 
whaling fleet. Waddell jubilantly recalled in his memoirs, “With such charts in my possession, I 
not only held a key to the navigation of all the Pacific Island, the Okhotsk and Bering Seas, and 
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the Arctic Ocean, but the most probable localities for finding the great Arctic whaling fleet of 
New England, without tiresome search.”70 Waddell held the principal tools to completing the 
mission Bulloch sent him on nearly six months before. He knew exactly where to find the Arctic 
whaling fleet, and the many New Bedford whalers that called those waters home. The 
Confederates never intended to find these charts, but when they did they held the key to the 
whaler’s undoing. Ironically, it was whalers that provided this key. 
 Armed with these valuable gifts, Waddell turned the Shenandoah north, arriving off the 
Kamchetta Peninsula by late May of 1865. Even though the war was essentially over, the 
Captain and crew of the Shenandoah had no idea and they went about their mission as originally 
planned. By this time of year, in the reaches of the North Pacific, the solid masses of ice begin to 
break up, giving way to some of the most abundant whaling grounds in the world. The bowhead 
whale inhabits these northern waters, and because of their high blubber content, intended to keep 
them insulated from the harsh Arctic waters, yield large amounts of oil.71 These were the prizes 
New Bedford’s whaling fleet hoped for, and as Captain Waddell sent a look-out aloft to 
investigate the breaking ice floe, he heralded, “Sail ho!” Following the tactical norm, Waddell 
had the Russian flag unfurled, in an attempt to deceive his prey. However, the prey and predator 
found themselves on opposite sides of a massive ice floe, and in what must have seemed like 
comedic act, the two followed each other on parallel tracks, with the Shenandoah being unable to 
catch the whaler. The whaler was the bark Abigail of New Bedford, and soon the crew of the 
Abigail’s luck ran out. As the ice floe ended, the Shenandoah moved in, replacing the Russian 
colors with those of the Confederacy and sending a boarding party to take the new prize.72 
Captain Ebenezer Nye, the master of the Abigail, was astonished. After expressing his disbelief, 
the boarding officer from the Shenandoah slyly remarked, “We have entered into a treaty 
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offensive and defensive with the whales, and we are up here by special agreement to dispose of 
their mortal enemy.”73 This was not Nye’s first encounter with a Confederate cruiser though. 
Several years before, he had been a master of another whaler which fell prey to the CSS 
Alabama. One discouraged member of the crew proclaimed, “You are more fortunate in picking 
up Confederate cruisers than whales. I will never again go with you, for if there is a cruiser out, 
you will find her.”74 Not only had Captain Nye lost his ship and precious cargo, but his 
reputation was forever tainted. 
 As the Abigail burned, the defiant Nye was said to proclaim, “You have not ruined me 
yet; I have ten thousand dollars at home, and before I left I lent it to the government to help fight 
such fellows as you.”75 This proved the Yankee whalers only defense against their adversary. 
Lacking the ability to fight themselves, merchants and masters donated large sums of money to 
the federal government in the hopes that the rebellion could be suppressed and safety assured to 
their vessels. However, such donations only depressed the industry further, as money invested in 
the war was money not invested in the latest technology or in the construction of new vessels.76  
Not only were merchants and masters like Ebenezer Nye suffering from higher insurance rates, 
the destruction of property, and the loss of valuable profits, but the war inadvertently directed 
their money away from their industry, thus fueling the further collapse of the industry.77 By 
trying to fund the war in order to protect their industry, they were bankrupting their own 
businesses.  
 Far worse, the New Bedford bark Abigail gave Waddell another crucial asset, when the 
bark’s second mate, Thomas S. Manning, joined the crew of the Shenandoah. Manning was 
originally from Baltimore, Maryland and was a southern sympathizer. Thus, when the 
opportunity presented itself, he had no qualms about joining the Shenandoah’s crew. Not only 
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was he an experienced seaman, but he also knew the approximate location of the whaling fleet. 
In conjunction with the captured charts and maps, Waddell had the perfect guide to lead him to 
his goal. 
 With Manning providing the directions, the Shenandoah continued its cruise arriving off 
Cape Navarin in the Bering Sea on June 21. It was here that the crew picked up on a trail of 
floating blubber and smoke, signs that a whaler was nearby. Sure enough they soon found the 
William Thompson and Euphrates, both of New Bedford. The Shenandoah’s crew made quick 
work of both ships, scavenging valuable rations and then setting the ships ablaze with their few 
hundred barrels of whale oil providing fuel for the fire.78   
 After a brief false alarm, which turned out to be an Australian whaler, the crew of the 
Shenandoah received concerning news from the crew of the William Thompson. The officers and 
crew of the William Thompson had recently stopped off in port in California on April 22, and 
heard news of President Lincoln’s assassination and the capture of Richmond, Virginia and 
Charleston, South Carolina.79 With no solid evidence to prove the claims, Waddell shrugged 
them off as red herrings and turned his sites on more New Bedford whalers. 
 As June 22 dawned, five more sets of sails were glimpsed by the lookout. Two of these 
belonged to foreign whalers, but the other three were New Bedford ships. One of these was the 
Milo, which Lieutenant Hunt described as a, “staunch and slow-moving vessel.”80 Easily sailing 
up to the Milo, the Shenandoah captured her. The Milo’s Captain, Johnathan C. Hawes was 
amazed that a Confederate cruiser was that far north.81 It seems that this was the general 
consensus among whalers in the Arctic. In fact, many had gone that far north in the hopes that 
this region would be a safe-haven from preying Confederate cruisers. This assumption clearly 
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could not have been more wrong. The unlikeliness of the Shenandoah’s voyage was certainly a 
contributing factor toward their efficacy.  
 In the meantime, the other two New Bedford whalers made a run for it. The Sophia 
Thornton was the slower of the two, and the Shenandoah easily caught up to her. After securing 
this newest catch, the Shenandoah steamed after the last vessel, the Jireh Swift. A three hour 
pursuit culminated with several warning shots fired from the Shenandoah’s thirty-two pound 
cannon and the immediate capitulation of the Jireh Swift.82  In two days Waddell captured five 
New Bedford whalers.  
 However, his success posed another problem; what should be done with all the prisoners? 
He solved this dilemma by making a deal with Captain Hawes of the Milo. Waddell offered to 
spare his vessel by bonding it if Hawes would take all the prisoners to San Francisco for him. In 
essence, Waddell would let Hawes go if he took the prisoners and agreed to pay $46,000 to the 
Confederate government for his ship. Hawes quickly agreed to the deal and as the prisoners were 
loaded onto the Milo, the Jireh Swift and Sophia Thornton were burned.83 Although Hawes never 
paid the $46,000 bond and his vessel was spared, the damage these mere two days had on the 
New Bedford whaling industry was catastrophic. Four vessels were destroyed, thousands of 
barrels of whale oil were burned, and thousands of dollars of supplies, tools, and materials were 
lost. According to estimates, just these two days cost New Bedford merchants $261,205.84 This 
was a blow that an already deflated economy could barely stand, and the worst part for New 
Bedford merchants was, the most treacherous day was yet to come.  
 Several days later, on June 26, the Shenandoah caught three more prizes, but only one of 
the whalers was from New Bedford. The Nimrod, captained by James M. Clark, was this 
unfortunate vessel. Like Captain Ebenezer Nye of New Bedford’s Abigail, Captain Clark had 
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also had his fair share of run-ins with Confederate cruisers. As the master of the Ocean Rover 
two years earlier, Raphael Seems and the Alabama captured and destroyed his whaling bark. 
Ironically, in both instances Confederate Lieutenant S. Smith Lee was the first to board one of 
Clark’s vessels. Lieutenant Lee thought of this second meeting as, “an excellent joke,” but Clark 
did not see the humor.85 No whaling captain wanted to be like Nye or Clark. It was bad enough 
suffering one destructive encounter with a Confederate cruiser, never mind two. 
 As Captain Clark surrendered one of his vessels for a second time during the war, the 
crew of the Shenandoah spotted five more whalers in the distance. Waddell and his crew were 
able to take three out of the five vessels, and all three, the Gypsy, Isabella, and General Pike 
were all New Bedford whalers. Now with nearly two hundred and twenty-two prisoners in his 
custody, Waddell bonded the General Pike for $45,000 and sent his prisoners on their way to 
San Francisco.86 In the past several months, the Shenandoah captured nine New Bedford 
whalers, a devastating blow to a city which had already lost nearly three dozen vessels since the 
beginning of the war. However, the next day, June 27, proved to be the most destructive single 
day for New Bedford’s whaling industry in its long history. 
 Early the next morning, Waddell spotted eleven more whaleships in the distance. First, 
the Shenandoah captured the New Bedford whaler Waverly and burned it, and by a little after 
noon, the Shenandoah was approaching the other ten vessels. It turns out nine vessels were 
gathered around the Brunswick of New Bedford which had recently lost a battle with an iceberg. 
The masters and crew of all ten vessels were in the process of auctioning off the materials, tools, 
and supplies on the Brunswick when the Shenandoah sailed up.87 In an amazing example of 
stealth and coordination, the crew of the Shenandoah utilized their five longboats and the threat 
from their artillery pieces to secure surrender from nine of the ten vessels. Of these nine vessels 
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six were from New Bedford, the ships James Murray, Isaac Howland, and Nassau, and the barks 
Congress, Hillman, and Martha.88   
However, the one hold out was the Favorite of Fairhaven. Although this vessel was from 
Fairhaven, this story is telling of the anguish, fear, and desperation shared among all whaling 
captains whether from New Bedford or not. In addition to this, historically Fairhaven and New 
Bedford were essentially the same greater metropolitan area, with the two halves only separated 
by the Acushnet River. With relatives on both sides of the river, business interest on both sides 
of the river, and connections on both sides of the river, these two separate cities were essentially 
one in the nineteenth century. Thus, the Favorite’s story was one of a New Bedford whaler.  
Captain Thomas G. Young was the master of the Favorite, and as a boarding party from 
the Shenandoah approached, Young made ready for a battle. Standing on the roof of his cabin, 
he loaded several guns and bomb guns (used for harpooning whales) and prepared to make a 
stand. As the Shenandoah’s boarding party neared, they returned to their cruiser when Young 
ordered them to “Stand off!” In response, Captain Waddell turned the Shenandoah so that his 
guns were trained on the Favorite, and gave the order to fire low, when instructed. There would 
be no warning shot this time. As this transpired, Captain Young was unpersuaded by the 
Favorite’s officers and crew as they attempted to talk him off the proverbial ledge. It was 
reported that the nearly sixty year old Young replied, “I have only four or five years to live 
anyway, and I might as well die now as any time, especially as all I have is invested in my 
vessel, and if I lose that I will have to go home penniless and die a pauper.” During a lull in the 
commotion, the officers of the Favorite removed the percussion caps from the firearms, 
rendering them useless. Then the officers and the crew left their salty captain on his bark and 
surrendered themselves to the Confederate cruiser.89 Left by himself, Young still refused to back 
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down. Upon being ordered to lower his colors by a Confederate officer, Young responded, “I’ll 
see you damned first.”  When advised that the Shenandoah would open fire, Young yelled back, 
“Blow away my buck, but may I be eternally blasted if I haul down that flag for any cussed 
Confederate pirate that ever floated.” However, when Young went to set off one of the bomb 
guns, it failed to fire because of the missing percussion caps. Finally, Young realized his last 
stand was hopeless and he surrendered to the Confederates.90  
Although Young’s defiant stand was far from the norm with whaling captains, his story 
does show the desperation that many of them felt. Young’s heroic quote of, “if I lose that [ship] I 
will have to go home penniless and die a pauper,” first appeared in the article, “The Man who 
Defied Waddell the Pirate,” in the Whalemen’s Shipping List on September 26, 1865.91 This 
quote symbolized the fears of many whaling merchants. If they lost their ships, a lifetime worth 
of investments would be gone. Hopefully, when they returned, insurance would pay for the 
vessel, but it rarely covered the product and materials lost. And with what money they had left, it 
was unlikely they would reinvest in the industry. The whaling business was tanking and there 
were much safer investments to be made in textile factories. But for those like Young, who had 
everything invested in perhaps one or two ships, the fate of death might have seemed preferable 
to life of destitution. Even the stoutest Yankee whalers, who had lived through equatorial storms, 
and the crushing ice of the Arctic feared meeting Young’s fate, and this article in the 
Whalemen’s Shipping List clearly emblemized that fear. 
 This fateful day, June 28, 1865, was the single most destructive day in New Bedford’s 
whaling history. Out of the ten total ships captured, seven were from New Bedford, and the 
Favorite, from Fairhaven, was in essence from New Bedford too. This brings the total to eight 
New Bedford vessels destroyed that day. The Shenandoah burned $340,563 of total value, and 
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bonded one vessel for $37,000. Thus, the total price tag for the city of New Bedford for this one 
day was over $370,000, more value than the Alabama destroyed in its entire cruise.92 This was 
the final legacy of the feared Confederate steamer, as Waddell soon decided it was most 
propitious to return to England, fearing that the war was over. The Shenandoah’s days of 
commerce raiding were over.  
 From the Confederate perspective, this cruise was a complete success, but from the 
Union side, it was a complete disaster. In total, the Shenandoah captured thirty-eight ships, 
destroyed thirty-four of them, and bonded the other four. Of these thirty-eight, twenty-five were 
whaleships, and of this number, twenty-one were from New Bedford. The cruiser destroyed well 
over 1.1 million dollars worth of value, and $752,692 of this was in burned New Bedford 
whalers. In addition, $123,000 worth of bonded New Bedford vessels brought their total 
destruction inflicted upon the city’s industry to $875,692.93 This was a stifling blow to the 
industry. Just the actions of the Shenandoah diminished New Bedford’s whaling fleet by nearly 
one quarter of the total vessels. This left many in New Bedford disheartened and lost. The 
Republican Standard bemoaned the navy’s failure to protect the industry, complaining, “It seems 
that there has been gross negligence on the part of the government, in leaving so important of a 
branch of national industry and so much property without adequate protection.”94 Undoubtedly, 
most of the city’s inhabitants shared these sentiments, condemning the federal government for its 
inaction. But no matter how much they accused the government of negligence, it was too late. 
The disaster very few saw coming was complete, and the industry never recovered its former 
glory. In this, the Confederates succeeded. This did not end the war in their favor, but it did 
destroy the gold mine of their mortal enemies. 
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 However, this was nothing new for New Bedford’s whaling industry. Following the 
American Revolution and the War of 1812, the industry had been on the breaking point. With the 
fleet almost completely dissolved, the industry rebuilt itself and grew larger than ever before. In 
fact, it was after the War of 1812, that the industry began its massive surge to its climax in the 
1850s. Many merchants thought this would be no different. However, time proved this 
assumption to be false. The industry never rebuilt after this decline. As historian Eric Dolan 
remarked, “The dissolution of the American whaling industry would be further accelerated… 
[and] that would soon render the Yankee whaleship a historical relic.”95  
 In all, the CSS Sumter, Alabama, and Shenandoah captured thirty New Bedford whaling 
vessels, costing the merchants of that city approximately $1,093,692.96 In modern dollars this 
equates to well over 15 million dollars. This massive economic blow happened at the wrong 
time. Perhaps, if the American Civil War happened a decade earlier, the industry might have 
been able to rebuild, but happening when it did, the war only accelerated the perfect storm of 
forces which ultimately destroyed the industry. Other factors which created this perfect storm 
included the discovery of petroleum by Pennsylvania farmers in 1859. This cheaper alternative to 
whale oil made the capturing of the great leviathan less lucrative. The Industrial Revolution also 
changed American society so much that by the mid-nineteenth century, the whaling industry 
seemed less appealing to investors in comparison to textile mills. Another factor was that New 
World whaling merchants failed to adapt to the modernizing of the industry, and thus stood little 
chance against the modernized fleets of Great Britain and Norway. Finally, the Arctic disasters 
of the 1870s destroyed over two dozen more New Bedford whalers and damaged the industry 
even further.97  
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 The War Between the States did not lead to the immediate destruction of the industry. It 
was not until the early 1920s when the last square-rigged whaling vessel left New Bedford, and 
this was well over a half a century after the war. However, this was one of the first of many 
events which combined to create the perfect storm which destroyed the industry. The war 
reduced the fleet down to nearly half its former size and diverted much needed capital away from 
the industry. Insurance rates soared cutting down on profit margins. As the industry became less 
lucrative the economy deflated even more. As a result, whaling never recovered and was well on 
its way to extinction. Thus, when Captain Young of the Favorite made his stand against the 
Shenandoah on that June afternoon in 1865, his stand held symbolic meaning. As defiant as the 
merchants were in resisting the ultimate end, they could not win their fight. Time proved to be 
against them, and just like Young, ultimately New Bedford’s industry was forced to surrender to 
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